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Abstract:	  We	  investigate	  how	  people	  coordinate	  within	  their	  own	  cultures,	  compared	  to	  
interactions	   with	   people	   from	   different	   cultures.	   As	   players	   are	   likely	   to	   experience	  
more	   ambiguity	   when	   playing	   a	   different	   culture,	   we	   expect	   players	   to	   choose	   safer	  
strategies.	   We	   run	   experiments	   with	   a	   stag	   hunt	   and	   bargaining	   coordination	   game.	  
Using	   a	   between-­‐subjects	   design,	   we	   vary	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   opponent	   between	  
someone	  of	  the	  same	  culture	  or	  a	  different	  culture.	  We	  compare	  the	  responses	  of	  British	  
and	  East	  Asian	  students	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Exeter	  and	  show	  the	  cultural	  identity	  of	  the	  
opponent	   by	   physical	   appearance.	   The	   players	   appear	   to	   use	   cultural	   stereotypes	   to	  
predict	  behaviour,	  especially	  in	  the	  bargaining	  game	  which	  may	  require	  more	  strategic	  
thought	   than	   the	   stag	   hunt	   game.	   In	   particular,	   the	   British	   act	   as	   though	   East	   Asians	  
would	   behave	   more	   cautiously	   than	   other	   British.	   According	   to	   our	   results,	   the	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   Coordination	   is	   important	   for	  many	  economic	  decisions,	  such	  as	   firms	  deciding	  
on	  output	  and	  pricing	  decisions	  without	  knowing	  the	  decisions	  of	  their	  competitors,	  or	  
Governments	   setting	   trade	   policy	   without	   knowing	   the	   strategies	   of	   other	   countries.	  
People	   from	   different	   backgrounds	   may	   use	   different	   heuristics	   when	   trying	   to	  
coordinate	  with	   others.	   Knowing	   how	   culture	   affects	   the	   ability	   to	   coordinate	  will	   be	  
useful	  for	  those	  engaging	  in	  trade	  or	  competition	  with	  people	  from	  other	  countries.	  
	   People	  from	  the	  same	  culture	  are	  likely	  to	  share	  similar	  norms	  and	  perhaps	  find	  
it	  easier	  to	  predict	  the	  behaviour	  of	  their	  opponent,	  thus	  improving	  coordination.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  when	  playing	  against	  someone	  from	  a	  different	  culture,	  the	  players	  may	  be	  
unfamiliar	  with	  each	  other’s	  norms	  and	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  cultural	  stereotypes	  to	  try	  and	  
predict	   the	  opponent’s	  behaviour.	  We	  expected	  players	   to	  experience	  more	  ambiguity	  
when	   playing	   against	   someone	   from	   a	   different	   culture	   and	   therefore	   choose	   safer	  
strategies	  in	  coordination	  games.	  
	   We	   ran	   two	   types	  of	   coordination	  games	  –	  a	   stag	  hunt	  and	  a	  bargaining	  game.	  
While	  we	  did	  not	  find	  East	  Asian	  students	  to	  differentiate	  very	  much	  between	  a	  British	  
or	  East	  Asian	  opponent,	   the	  British	   students	   tended	   to	   act	   very	  differently	   against	   an	  
East	  Asian	  opponent	  compared	  to	  a	  British	  opponent.	   In	  a	  stag	  hunt	  game,	   the	  British	  
students	  played	  the	  safer	  strategy	  more	  often	  against	  an	  East	  Asian	  opponent,	  while	  in	  a	  
bargaining	  game	  they	  demanded	  more	  of	  the	  pie.	  The	  British	  seemed	  to	  be	  basing	  their	  
behaviour	  on	  a	  cultural	  stereotype	  that	  East	  Asians	  are	  cautious.	  However,	  our	  results	  




2.	  Background	  Literature	   	  
	   Although	   cultural	   differences	   in	   coordination	   games	  have	  not	   yet	   been	   studied	  
extensively,	   some	  related	   literature	  has	  demonstrated	   the	   importance	  of	   social	  norms	  
(e.g.	  Singh,	  2012)	  and	  group	  identity	  (e.g.	  Benjamin	  et	  al,	  2010;	  Chen	  and	  Chen,	  2011;	  
Chen	  et	  al,	  2014)	  for	  coordination	  game	  outcomes.	  As	  culture	  is	  one	  aspect	  of	  identity,	  
we	  can	  expect	  a	  group	  identity	  to	  be	  stronger	  when	  players	  are	  from	  the	  same	  cultural	  
background.	   Chen	   and	   Chen	   (2011)	   show	   that	   a	   salient	   group	   identity	   increases	  
coordination	  on	  Pareto	  superior	  outcomes	  in	  the	  minimum	  effort	  coordination	  game.	  As	  
Chen	  and	  Chen	  impose	  only	  minimal	  group	  identities	  in	  the	  lab1,	  we	  can	  expect	  natural	  
group	  identities	  such	  as	  culture	  to	  have	  an	  even	  stronger	  effect.	  Similarly,	  social	  norms	  
are	   culture	   specific,	   and	   norms	   of	   sharing	   and	   cooperation	   within	   a	   community	   are	  
likely	  to	  increase	  efficiency	  in	  coordination	  games	  such	  as	  the	  stag	  hunt	  (Singh,	  2012).	  
Finally,	   expectations	   and	   beliefs	   are	   also	   important	   in	   coordination	   game	   decisions.	  
When	   playing	   against	   someone	   from	   another	   culture,	   people	   may	   find	   it	   harder	   to	  
predict	  their	  opponent’s	  behaviour	  and	  need	  to	  rely	  on	  stereotypes	  when	  forming	  their	  
beliefs	  (Fershtman	  and	  Gneezy,	  2001;	  Hsee	  and	  Weber,	  1999).	  
	   2.1	  Social	  Norms	   	  
	   Singh	  (2012)	  considers	  how	  norms	  of	  trust	  within	  a	  society	  will	  affect	  behaviour	  
in	   the	  stag	  hunt	  game.	  Typical	  payoffs	   for	  a	   two-­‐player	  stag	  hunt	  game	  are	   illustrated	  
below	  in	  Figure	  1.	  The	  story	  goes	  as	  follows.	  Players	  must	  choose	  whether	  to	  hunt	  a	  stag	  
or	  a	  hare	  when	  out	  hunting.	  Capturing	  a	  stag	  is	  more	  valuable	  than	  a	  hare	  but	  requires	  
the	  help	  of	  both	  players.	  Therefore,	  if	  a	  player	  hunts	  a	  stag	  without	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Minimal	  groups	  are	  where	  participants	  are	  randomly	  allocated	   to	  groups	  and	  given	  an	  arbitrary	   label	  
such	  as	  the	  “blue”	  or	  “yellow”	  group.	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other	  player,	  he	  will	  receive	  a	  payoff	  of	  zero.	  Capturing	  a	  hare	  is	  easier	  and	  guarantees	  a	  
small	  but	  sure	  payoff.	  We	  assume	  that	  players	  are	  separated	  and	  cannot	  communicate	  
while	  on	  the	  hunt,	  thus	  coordination	  is	  important	  for	  reaching	  an	  equilibrium.	  
Figure	  1:	  Stag	  Hunt	  Game	  
	   	   Player	  2	  
	   Stag	   Hare	  
Player	  1	   Stag	   2,	  2	   0,	  1	  
Hare	   1,	  0	   1,	  1	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  pure	  strategy	  Nash	  equilibria	   in	   this	  game.	  The	  payoff	  dominant	  
equilibrium	   is	  where	   all	   players	   help	   in	   hunting	   a	   stag	   and	   obtain	  maximum	  payoffs.	  
However,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  risk	  dominant	  equilibrium,	  where	  each	  player	  guarantees	  him	  
or	  herself	  a	  sure	  payoff	  from	  hunting	  a	  hare.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  mixed	  strategy	  equilibrium,	  
where	   each	   player	   hunts	   stag	   or	   hare	   with	   a	   certain	   payoff-­‐dependent	   probability.	  
According	   to	   Singh	   (2012),	   people	   from	   societies	  with	   a	   norm	  of	   high	   trust	   are	  more	  
likely	   to	   coordinate	   on	   the	   payoff	   dominant	   outcome,	   whereas	   people	   from	   societies	  
with	  a	  norm	  of	  low	  trust	  will	  be	  driven	  towards	  the	  risk	  dominant	  equilibrium.	  This	  is	  
because	  in	  a	  low	  trust	  society,	  people	  expect	  that	  the	  other	  player	  will	  be	  untrusting	  and	  
prefer	   to	   guarantee	   themselves	   a	   hare.	   Therefore,	   their	   best	   response	   is	   to	   also	   hunt	  
hare	  to	  avoid	  ending	  up	  with	  nothing.	  
Using	  data	   from	  the	  World	  Values	  Survey,	  Singh	   (2012)	  concludes	   that	  64%	  of	  
countries	  are	  characterised	  by	  low	  trust.	  In	  particular,	  countries	  with	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  
trust	   include	   African	   countries	   such	   as	   Uganda	   and	   Tanzania,	   whereas	   Scandinavian	  
countries	  such	  as	  Denmark	  and	  Sweden	  have	  the	  highest	   levels	  of	   trust	  (Singh,	  2012).	  
Trust	   is	  particularly	  important	  in	  societies	  that	   lack	  formal	  contracts	  and	  enforcement	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mechanisms.	  In	  such	  societies,	  trust	  provides	  an	  incentive	  to	  engage	  in	  business	  deals	  as	  
people	  can	  expect	  to	  be	  fairly	  compensated	  for	  their	  actions.	  
Singh	   develops	   a	   theory	   of	   how	   people	   base	   their	   expectations	   of	   others’	  
behaviour	  on	  a	  sample	  of	  past	  interactions.	  A	  society	  will	  then	  converge	  towards	  either	  
a	  low	  or	  high	  trust	  norm,	  which	  respectively	  correspond	  to	  the	  risk	  dominant	  and	  payoff	  
dominant	   equilibria	   in	   the	   stag	   hunt	   game.	   We	   can	   think	   of	   the	   mixed	   strategy	  
equilibrium	   as	   a	   society	   with	   a	   norm	   of	   medium	   trust.	   However,	   the	   medium	   trust	  
society	  is	  highly	  unstable.	  As	  people	  update	  their	  expectations	  of	  others’	  behaviour	  after	  
each	   interaction,	   a	   few	   successive	   positive	   or	   negative	   interactions	   could	   push	   the	  
society	  towards	  either	  the	  high	  or	   low	  trust	  equilibrium.	  In	  such	  a	  society,	  monitoring	  
and	  enforcement	  could	  be	  used	  to	  prevent	  convergence	  to	  the	  low	  trust	  equilibrium.	  
Singh’s	  theory	  of	  how	  trust	  norms	  affect	  coordination	  in	  the	  stag	  hunt	  has	  not	  yet	  
been	  empirically	  tested.	  We	  can	  expect	  people	  from	  collectivist	  cultures,	  such	  as	  China	  
and	   India	   (Hofstede,	   1980),	   to	   have	   norms	   of	   working	   together	   and	   sharing	   in	   the	  
community,	  which	  may	  increase	  coordination	  on	  the	  payoff	  dominant	  outcome.	  
	   2.2	  Group	  Identity	  
	   Identity	  was	   introduced	   into	  economic	  models	  by	  Akerlof	   and	  Kranton	   (2000),	  
who	  theoretically	  show	  that	  people	  like	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reinforces	  their	  identity.	  
Extending	   this	   idea,	  Chen	  and	  Chen	   (2011)	   experimentally	   find	   that	   a	   common	  group	  
identity2	   increases	   coordination	   on	   the	   payoff	   dominant	   equilibrium	   in	   a	   minimum	  
effort	  game	  (Huyck	  et	  al,	  1990),	  but	  only	  when	  the	  group	  identity	  is	  made	  salient.	  They	  
make	  the	  group	  identity	  salient	  by	  allowing	  participants	  to	  communicate	  in	  their	  groups	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Using	  randomly	  assigned	  minimal	  groups,	  which	  are	  labelled	  according	  to	  colour.	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when	  trying	  to	  solve	  a	  task	  where	  they	  have	  to	  match	  paintings	  to	  the	  respective	  artists.	  
If	  participants	  help	  each	  other	  in	  the	  communication	  stage,	  the	  authors	  suggest	  they	  will	  
be	  more	  likely	  to	  reciprocate	  when	  playing	  the	  minimum	  effort	  coordination	  game.	  	  
	   Worth	  noting,	   is	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   efficiency	  may	   also	  be	  driven	  by	   a	   shift	   in	  
beliefs	  about	  the	  underlying	  probability	  distribution	  of	  the	  other	  players’	  actions,	  rather	  
than	   an	   increase	   in	   altruism.	   Perhaps	   some	   participants	   in	   Chen	   and	   Chen’s	   (2011)	  
study	  decided	  to	  go	   for	   the	  payoff	  dominant	  outcome	  because	  they	  believed	  the	  other	  
players	  were	  more	   likely	   to	  do	   the	  same	  after	   the	  communication	  stage.	  Therefore,	  as	  
well	   as	   a	   potential	   increase	   in	   the	   other-­‐regarding	   parameter,	   the	   beliefs	   about	  
probabilities	  regarding	  the	  other	  players’	  behaviour	   is	  another	   factor	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  
considered	  in	  explaining	  Chen	  and	  Chen’s	  (2011)	  results.	  
	   2.3	  Expectations	  and	  Stereotypes	  
	   Expectations	  of	  other	  peoples’	  behaviour	  may	  rely	  on	  stereotypes,	  which	  do	  not	  
necessarily	  represent	  the	  social	  norm3.	  For	  example,	  Fershtman	  and	  Gneezy	  (2001)	  find	  
that	  men	  of	  Eastern	  Jewish	  origin	  (Asian	  or	  African)	  in	  Israel	  are	  discriminated	  against	  
in	   a	   trust	   game	   because	   they	   have	   an	   ethnic	   stereotype	   of	   being	   untrustworthy.	  
However,	  the	  stereotype	  was	  found	  to	  be	  unjustified	  in	  the	  trust	  game	  as	  Eastern	  Jewish	  
participants	   did	   not	   send	   back	   significantly	   lower	   amounts	   than	  men	   of	   European	   or	  
American	   Jewish	   origin.	   They	   also	   find	   men	   of	   Eastern	   Jewish	   origin	   to	   be	   allocated	  
more	  money	  in	  an	  ultimatum	  game	  because	  they	  have	  a	  stereotype	  of	  reacting	  harshly	  
to	  unfairness.	  Again,	  this	  stereotype	  was	  unfounded	  in	  actual	  rejection	  rates.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Stereotypes	  are	  often	  correlated	  with	  social	  norms,	  as	  people	  gain	  utility	  from	  belonging	  to	  a	  group	  and	  
thus	   often	   prefer	   to	   conform	   to	   group	   stereotypes	   in	   order	   to	   reinforce	   their	   group	   membership	  
(Geisinger,	  2004;	  Shih	  et	  al,	  1999).	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   Similarly,	   Hsee	   and	  Weber	   (1999)	   find	   predictions	   of	   risk	   aversion	   in	   Chinese	  
and	  American	  participants	  to	  be	  in	  contrast	  to	  actual	  behaviour.	  Participants	  apparently	  
rely	   on	   a	   misleading	   cultural	   stereotype	   that	   Americans	   are	   more	   risk	   seeking	   than	  
Chinese,	  probably	  because	  Americans	  are	  portrayed	  as	  risk	  seeking	   in	  movies.	   In	   fact,	  
the	   results	   show	   the	   opposite	   –	   Chinese	   are	   more	   risk	   seeking	   than	   Americans	   in	  
financial	   lottery	   choice	   tasks	  when	  asked	   to	   choose	  between	  a	   certain	  outcome	  and	  a	  
gamble.	   However,	   the	   predictions	   of	   participants	   in	   Hsee	   and	   Weber’s	   (1999)	  
experiment	  are	  not	  made	  salient	  by	  paying	  people	  for	  correct	  predictions.	  
	   Participants	  in	  Hsee	  and	  Weber’s	  (1999)	  study	  apparently	  rely	  even	  more	  on	  the	  
misleading	   stereotype	   when	   trying	   to	   predict	   behaviour	   of	   those	   from	   a	   different	  
culture.	  The	  Chinese	  participants	  expected	  Americans	  to	  be	  even	  more	  risk	  seeking	  than	  
the	  American	  participants	  expected	  of	  each	  other.	  Similarly,	  the	  American	  participants	  
expected	   the	   Chinese	   to	   be	   even	   more	   cautious	   than	   the	   Chinese	   expected	   of	   other	  
Chinese.	  When	   trying	   to	   predict	   behaviour	   of	   people	   in	   other	   countries,	   participants	  
have	   less	   scope	   to	  base	   their	  prediction	  on	  people	   they	  know,	   and	   thus	   rely	  more	  on	  
stereotypes.	  This	  suggests	  that	  people	  will	  likely	  face	  more	  ambiguity	  when	  interacting	  
with	  those	  from	  another	  culture.	  
	   2.4	  Ambiguity	  and	  Coordination	  Games	  
	   Ambiguity	   refers	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   the	   relevant	   probabilities	   are	   unknown	  
and	  cannot	  be	  estimated	  to	  a	  reasonable	  degree.	  Eichberger	  et	  al	  (2008)	  show	  that	  the	  
identity	   of	   the	   opponent	   matters	   for	   ambiguity,	   with	   participants	   experiencing	  more	  
ambiguity	  when	   playing	   strategic	   games	   against	   a	   granny	   than	   a	   game	   theorist.	  Most	  
students	   reported	   that	   the	   game	   theorist’s	   behaviour	   was	   easier	   to	   guess	   than	   the	  
granny	   and	   that	   they	   would	   prefer	   to	   play	   against	   the	   game	   theorist.	   As	   such,	   the	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students	   chose	   more	   ambiguity-­‐averse	   strategies	   against	   the	   granny	   than	   the	   game	  
theorist.	   	  As	  people	   are	   less	   familiar	  with	   the	   social	   norms	  of	   other	   cultures,	   perhaps	  
they	   will	   experience	   more	   ambiguity	   when	   playing	   strategic	   games	   and	   therefore	  
choose	  safer	  strategies.	  
	   A	   high	   degree	   of	   ambiguity	   can	   hinder	   coordination	   on	   the	   payoff	   dominant	  
outcome	   in	   many	   coordination	   games.	   Eichberger	   and	   Kelsey	   (2002)	   consider	   a	  
bargaining	  game	  where	  players	  can	  make	  claims	  on	  a	  total	  payoff,	  say	  4,	  but	  if	  the	  claims	  
exceed	  4,	  everyone	  receives	  0.	  As	  the	  players	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  communicate,	  the	  game	  
can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   coordination	   game.	   Any	   outcome	   that	   exhausts	   the	   available	  
surplus	   is	   a	   Nash	   equilibrium.	   However,	   with	   sufficient	   ambiguity,	   participants	   will	  
prefer	  to	  claim	  lower	  amounts,	  leading	  to	  inefficient	  outcomes.	  The	  two-­‐player	  version	  
of	  this	  bargaining	  game	  where	  players	  can	  claim	  1,	  2,	  or	  3	  is	  illustrated	  below	  in	  Figure	  
2.	  
Figure	  2:	  Bargaining	  Coordination	  Game	  
	   	   Player	  2	  
	   	   3	   2	   1	  
	   3	   0	  ,	  0	   0	  ,	  0	   3,	  1	  
Player	  1	   2	   0	  ,	  0	   2,	  2	   2,	  1	  
	   1	   1,	  3	   1,	  2	   1,	  1	  
	  
As	   people	   are	   likely	   to	   experience	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   ambiguity	  when	   playing	  
against	  someone	  from	  another	  culture,	  we	  can	  expect	  such	  games	  to	  result	  in	  inefficient	  
equilibria.	  However,	  social	  norms	  may	  also	  govern	  behaviour.	  For	  example,	  people	  from	  
societies	  where	  fairness	  or	  equality	  is	  highly	  valued	  may	  select	  the	  efficient	  equilibrium	  
of	   (2,	   2)	   as	   a	   focal	   point.	   Similarly,	   those	   from	   trusting	   cultures	  may	   find	   it	   easier	   to	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coordinate	   on	   an	   efficient	   outcome,	   as	   in	   the	   stag	   hunt	   game	   discussed	   above.	   In	  
contrast,	  those	  from	  low	  trust	  cultures	  may	  be	  driven	  towards	  inefficient	  outcomes	  such	  
as	   (1,	   1).	   To	   allow	   ambiguity	   and	   social	   norms	   to	   have	  maximum	   effect,	   we	   need	   to	  
remove	  any	  obvious	  focal	  points	  when	  testing	  this	  game	  experimentally.	  
The	   bargaining	   game	   discussed	   above	   differs	   from	   the	   stag	   hunt	   in	   that	   the	  
bargaining	  game	  is	  a	  situation	  of	  strategic	  substitutes,	  whereas	  the	  stag	  hunt	  is	  a	  game	  
with	  strategic	  complements.	  Eichberger	  and	  Kelsey	  (2002)	  show	  that	   the	   implications	  
of	  ambiguity	  differ	  depending	  on	  whether	  a	  game	  has	  strategic	  substitutes	  or	  strategic	  
complements.	  Strategic	  substitutes	  are	  where	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  opponent’s	  action	  will	  
decrease	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  of	  one’s	  own	  action.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  bargaining	  game	  
above,	  a	  larger	  claim	  of	  the	  opponent	  decreases	  the	  marginal	  benefit	  of	  one’s	  own	  claim.	  
Strategic	   complements	   are	   the	   opposite:	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   opponent’s	   action	  makes	  
one’s	   own	   action	  more	   beneficial,	   as	   in	   the	   stag	   hunt	   game.	   If	   the	   opponent	   switches	  
from	  hunting	  hare	  to	  hunting	  stag,	  this	  increases	  the	  benefit	  of	  putting	  in	  the	  extra	  effort	  
to	  hunt	  stag.	  
Eichberger	   and	   Kelsey	   (2002)	   show	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   ambiguity	   will	   have	  
opposite	  effects	  in	  games	  with	  strategic	  complements	  and	  substitutes,	  but	  this	  depends	  
on	  whether	  there	  are	  positive	  or	  negative	  externalities.	  In	  the	  bargaining	  game	  we	  have	  
negative	  aggregate	  externalities,	  because	  an	  increase	  in	  demand	  of	  the	  opponent	  lowers	  
payoffs.	   Under	   negative	   externalities,	   in	   a	   game	   with	   strategic	   substitutes	   (e.g.	   the	  
bargaining	  game),	  an	  increase	  in	  ambiguity	  will	  lower	  equilibrium	  actions.	  However,	  the	  
opposite	   result	   holds	   under	   positive	   externalities.	   With	   strategic	   complements,	   an	  
increase	  in	  ambiguity	  will	  increase	  equilibrium	  actions	  under	  negative	  externalities,	  but	  
decrease	   equilibrium	   actions	   under	   positive	   externalities.	   The	   stag	   hunt	   game	   has	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positive	  externalities,	  i.e.	  a	  higher	  action	  by	  the	  opponent	  is	  beneficial,	  which	  means	  that	  
ambiguity	   should	   lower	   equilibrium	   actions	   in	   the	   game,	   leading	   to	   the	   inefficient	  
equilibrium	  where	  all	  players	  hunt	  hare.	  Therefore,	  an	   increase	   in	  ambiguity,	  perhaps	  
by	  playing	  someone	  from	  a	  different	  culture,	  has	  undesirable	  implications	  for	  both	  the	  
stag	  hunt	  and	  bargaining	  coordination	  games.	  
	   2.5	  Previous	  Experimental	  Results	  
	   le	  Roux	  and	  Kelsey	  (2016)	  compare	  the	  level	  of	  ambiguity	  when	  playing	  against	  a	  
local	   or	   a	   foreign	   opponent	   in	   coordination	   games	   with	   multiple	   equilibria.	   Their	  
participant	   pool	   consists	   of	   students	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Exeter	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   St.	  
Stephen’s	  College	  in	  New	  Delhi,	  India.	  They	  firstly	  run	  the	  experiment	  in	  India	  and	  then	  
match	  the	  students	  in	  Exeter	  with	  both	  another	  Exeter	  student	  and	  a	  foreign	  opponent	  
from	  the	  Indian	  sample.	  Students	  in	  the	  Exeter	  experiment	  are	  explicitly	  told	  that	  they	  
are	  playing	  against	  students	  in	  India	  and	  are	  given	  some	  background	  information	  on	  the	  
Indian	  students,	  e.g.	  that	  they	  are	  studying	  at	  a	  prestigious	  institution.	  
	   le	   Roux	   and	   Kelsey	   (2016)	   find	   no	   difference	   in	   the	   level	   of	   ambiguity	   when	  
playing	   a	   local	   or	   foreign	   opponent.	   They	   offer	   the	   following	   reasons	   for	   this.	   Firstly,	  
part	  of	  the	  experiment	  uses	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  design	  where	  players	  face	  both	  a	  local	  and	  
foreign	   opponent.	   Participants	  may	   have	   simply	  wanted	   to	   appear	   consistent	   in	   their	  
choices	   against	   different	   opponents.	   In	   addition,	   some	   students	   were	   worried	   about	  
appearing	  racist	  if	  they	  change	  their	  behaviour	  towards	  the	  foreign	  opponents.	  We	  can	  
get	  around	  this	  first	  point	  by	  using	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  design	  so	  that	  students	  are	  faced	  
with	  either	  an	  opponent	  from	  their	  own	  culture	  or	  a	  different	  culture,	  but	  not	  both.	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   However,	   le	  Roux	  and	  Kelsey	   (2016)	  also	  point	  out	   that	  participants	  may	  have	  
found	  it	  easy	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  foreign	  students	  and	  thought	  they	  were	  the	  same	  as	  
any	   other	   students	   due	   to	   increasing	   globalisation.	   As	   universities	   in	   the	   UK	   have	  
become	   very	   international,	   students	   are	   used	   to	   mingling	   with	   people	   from	   many	  
different	  cultures	  and	  probably	  see	  more	  similarities	  than	  differences	  with	  their	  fellow	  
students.	  This	  point	  is	  difficult	  to	  control	  for	  and	  can	  only	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	  extending	  the	  
sample	   to	   non-­‐students	   who	   perhaps	   have	   less	   interaction	   with	   others	   from	   abroad.	  
Such	  an	  extension	  is	  a	  promising	  avenue	  for	  future	  work.	  
3.	  Experimental	  Design	  
	   We	  tested	  whether	  players	  from	  the	  same	  cultural	  background	  coordinate	  better	  
when	   playing	   strategic	   games,	   such	   as	   a	   stag	   hunt	   and	   a	   bargaining	   game.	   As	   the	  
probabilities	   of	   the	   opponent’s	   decision	   were	   unknown	   in	   these	   games,	   the	   decision	  
environment	  was	   one	   of	   ambiguity	   rather	   than	   risk.	   Players	   should	   experience	  more	  
ambiguity	   when	   playing	   against	   someone	   from	   a	   different	   culture	   as	   they	   are	   less	  
familiar	  with	  the	  social	  norms	  of	  that	  culture.	  As	  such,	  we	  predicted	  that	  players	  from	  
different	   cultures	   will	   prefer	   safer	   strategies	   and	   therefore	   choose	   less	   efficient	  
outcomes	  in	  coordination	  games.	  
We	   ran	   a	   between-­‐subjects	   design	   where	   players	   faced	   either	   someone	   from	  
their	  own	  culture	  or	  someone	  a	  different	  culture,	  but	  not	  both.	  This	  was	  to	  remove	  the	  
confound	  of	  participants	  wanting	   to	  appear	   consistent	  against	  different	  opponents,	   as	  
noted	  by	  le	  Roux	  and	  Kelsey	  (2016).	  All	  participants	  played	  either	  a	  one-­‐shot	  stag	  hunt	  
game	  or	  a	  one-­‐shot	  bargaining	  game.	  The	  reason	  we	  chose	  one-­‐shot	  games	  was	  to	  make	  
the	   decisions	   highly	   salient	   for	   the	   participants	   and	   avoid	   wealth	   effects	   in	   future	  
rounds.	   We	   also	   wanted	   to	   avoid	   participants	   hedging	   risk	   between	   the	   two	   games,	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which	  is	  why	  each	  participant	  only	  played	  either	  the	  stag	  hunt	  or	  bargaining	  game,	  not	  
both.	  
We	   recruited	   East	   Asian	   and	   British	   students	   to	   the	   Finance	   and	   Economics	  
Experimental	   Laboratory	   (FEELE)	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Exeter.	   Using	   ORSEE	   (Greiner,	  
2004),	  we	  recruited	  participants	  based	  on	  surnames,	  with	  a	  mixture	  of	  East	  Asian	  and	  
English	  surnames	  invited	  to	  sessions.	  We	  verified	  that	  all	  of	  the	  participants	  with	  East	  
Asian	   surnames	   were	   East	   Asian	   by	   checking	   their	   responses	   to	   a	   follow-­‐up	  
questionnaire	  and	  did	  the	  same	  for	  participants	  with	  English	  surnames.	  A	  small	  number	  
of	  participants	  with	  English	  surnames	  came	  from	  other	  individualistic	  English-­‐speaking	  
countries	  such	  as	  Australia	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  All	  of	  the	  participants	  with	  East	  Asian	  
surnames	  were	  in	  fact	  from	  East	  Asian	  backgrounds,	  with	  the	  vast	  majority	  coming	  from	  
China	  and	  a	  small	  number	  from	  Vietnam,	  Thailand,	  and	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  
We	  ran	  two	  different	  treatments,	  which	  are	  summarised	  below:	  
Treatment	  One:	  The	  opponent	  was	   from	  the	  same	  culture,	  which	  was	  achieved	  
by	  inviting	  either	  all	  East	  Asian	  or	  all	  British	  participants	  to	  sessions.	  	  
Treatment	  Two:	  The	  opponent	  was	   from	  a	  different	  culture.	  Here,	  we	   invited	  a	  
mixture	   of	   East	   Asian	   and	  British	   participants	   and	  matched	   them	   against	   each	  
other.	  






Figure	  3:	  Number	  of	  Participants	  per	  Treatment	  per	  Culture	  
	   East	  Asian	   British	  
Treatment	  One:	  Same	  Culture	   32	   28	  
Treatment	  Two:	  Different	  Culture	   32	   32	  
	  
The	  main	  reasons	  for	  choosing	  East	  Asians	  and	  British	  were	  that	  the	  two	  cultures	  
have	   very	   different	   social	   norms	   and	   that	   they	   have	   obvious	   differences	   in	   physical	  
appearance.	   To	   avoid	   experimenter	   demand	   effects4,	  we	   used	   physical	   appearance	   to	  
subtly	   show	   the	   cultural	   identity	   of	   the	   participants.	   This	   was	   achieved	   by	   telling	  
participants	  they	  were	  randomly	  matched	  with	  another	  player	  who	  was	  seated	  on	  the	  
other	  side	  of	  the	  room.	  However,	  to	  preserve	  anonymity	  we	  did	  not	  reveal	  who	  on	  the	  
other	  side	  of	  the	  room	  they	  were	  matched	  with.	  
Therefore,	  in	  the	  East	  Asian-­‐only	  and	  British-­‐only	  sessions,	  the	  participants	  were	  
matched	  with	  someone	  from	  their	  own	  culture.	  In	  the	  different-­‐culture	  treatments,	  East	  
Asians	  were	  seated	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  room	  and	  British	  on	  the	  other	  so	  that	  participants	  
were	  matched	  with	  someone	  from	  a	  different	  culture.	  We	  ran	  two	  sessions	  here	  to	  swap	  
which	  side	  of	  the	  room	  the	  Asians	  and	  British	  were	  seated	  on,	  in	  case	  this	  had	  any	  effect	  
on	   their	  behaviour.	  There	  were	  no	   significant	  differences	   in	  behaviour	  between	   these	  
sessions.	  
Given	   the	   large	   number	   of	   East	   Asian	   and	   British	   students	   studying	   at	   the	  
university,	  we	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  having	  only	  East	  Asian	  or	  British	  students	  on	  one	  side	  
of	   the	   room	   would	   feel	   unusual	   for	   the	   participants.	   However,	   we	   tested	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   Brislin	   and	   Lonner	   (1973,	   p.	   70)	   note	   that	   experimenter	   demand	   effects,	   or	   “courtesy	   bias”,	   are	  
particularly	  prevalent	  in	  Eastern	  cultures,	  where	  participants	  like	  to	  please	  the	  experimenter.	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experimenter	  demand	  effects	  by	  asking	  participants	  what	  they	  thought	  the	  experiment	  
was	  about	  in	  a	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaire,	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  Benjamin	  et	  al	  (2010).	  	  
The	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  three	  stages:	  priming,	  stag	  hunt	  game	  or	  bargaining	  
game,	   and	   follow-­‐up	  questionnaire.	  All	   of	   the	   stages	  were	   run	  on	   computer	   terminals	  
using	  z-­‐Tree	  (Fischbacher,	  2007).	  Full	   instructions	   for	   the	  experiment	  are	  available	   in	  
Appendix	  One.	  Participants	  were	  given	  each	  set	  of	  instructions	  separately	  for	  each	  stage	  
of	  the	  experiment.	  
	   3.1	  Priming	  
	   Players	   were	   primed	   before	   taking	   part	   in	   the	   game,	   in	   order	   to	   make	   their	  
cultural	   identities	   salient.	  We	  used	  a	  questionnaire	   to	   subtly	  get	  participants	   thinking	  
about	   their	   own	   culture	   (Shih	   et	   al,	   1999).	   This	   type	   of	   priming	   avoids	   inducing	   any	  
particular	   stereotype	   which	   may	   affect	   behaviour.	   For	   example,	   showing	   American	  
participants	  the	  Statue	  of	  Liberty	  may	  induce	  a	  feeling	  of	  freedom.	  Inducing	  stereotypes	  
is	   dangerous	   as	   stereotypes	   can	   sometimes	   be	   misleading	   (Hsee	   and	   Weber,	   1999).	  
Instead,	  by	  completing	  a	  questionnaire,	  participants	  think	  about	  the	  people	  they	  know	  
and	  social	  norms	  of	  their	  culture	  rather	  than	  stereotypes.	  The	  questions	  we	  used	  in	  the	  
priming	   stage	   were	   intended	   to	   get	   participants	   thinking	   of	   their	   friends	   and	   family	  
back	  home,	  and	  were	  as	  follows:	  
What	  year	  of	  study	  are	  you	  in	  at	  Exeter?	  
How	  many	  full	  years	  have	  you	  lived	  in	  the	  UK?	  
How	  often	  do	  you	  talk	  to	  people	  from	  your	  home	  country	  here	  in	  Exeter?	  
Do	  you	  live	  with	  your	  family	  during	  term	  time?	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If	  you	  answered	  "no"	  above,	  how	  many	  trips	  do	  you	  make	  to	  visit	  your	  family	  each	  
year?	  
	   3.2	  Stag	  Hunt	  Game	  
	   Our	  simple	  2-­‐player	  stag	  hunt	  game	  is	  illustrated	  below	  in	  Figure	  4.	  Players	  had	  
two	  strategies	  to	  choose	  from,	  which	  we	  label	  as	  “1”	  and	  “2”.	  We	  kept	  the	  labels	  neutral,	  
rather	   than	   calling	   the	   strategies	   “hunt	   hare”	   or	   “hunt	   stag”.	   This	   is	   because	   the	  
descriptive	   labels	  may	  be	   interpreted	  in	  a	  very	  different	  way	  by	  people	   from	  different	  
cultures.	  The	  payoffs	  in	  Figure	  4	  are	  given	  in	  Experimental	  Currency	  Units	  (ECU),	  which	  
were	  converted	  into	  pounds	  after	  the	  experiment.	  
Figure	  4:	  Stag	  Hunt	  Game	  
	   	   Other	  Player’s	  Choice	  
	   	   2	   1	  
Your	  
Choice	  
2	   60,	  60	   0,	  40	  
1	   40,	  0	   40,	  40	  
	  
3.3	  Bargaining	  Game	  
	   The	  bargaining	  game	   involved	  a	   surplus	  of	  40	  ECU	   to	  be	   shared	  between	  each	  
pair	   of	   participants.	   Each	   participant	   needed	   to	   decide	   how	   much	   of	   the	   40	   ECU	   to	  
demand	   for	   themselves	   before	   knowing	   the	   decision	   of	   their	   opponent.	   If	   the	   total	  
demands	  exceeded	  40,	  both	  players	  received	  zero.	  If	  the	  total	  demands	  were	  less	  than	  
or	  equal	  to	  40,	  each	  player	  received	  the	  amount	  they	  demanded.	  However,	  participants	  
had	  only	  four	  options	  in	  the	  amount	  they	  could	  demand,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  obvious	  focal	  
point.	  This	  means	  that	  social	  norms	  become	  important	  in	  trying	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  
opponent	  will	  choose.	  The	  bargaining	  game	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  5.	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Figure	  5:	  Bargaining	  Game	  
	   	   Other	  Player’s	  Choice	  
	   	   30	   25	   15	   10	  
	   30	   0,	  0	   0,	  0	   0,	  0	   30,	  10	  
Your	  
Choice	  
25	   0,	  0	   0,	  0	   25,	  15	   25,	  10	  
15	   0,	  0	   15,	  25	   15,	  15	   15,	  10	  
	   10	   10,	  30	   10,	  25	   10,	  15	   10,	  10	  
	  
3.4	  Follow-­‐up	  Questionnaire	  
	   Once	  the	  game	  was	  complete,	  the	  participants	  were	  shown	  the	  decisions	  of	  their	  
opponent	  and	  their	   total	  payoff	   from	  the	  experiment.	  After	  payoffs	  were	  revealed,	   the	  
experiment	   was	   concluded	   with	   a	   demographic	   questionnaire,	   to	   control	   for	   other	  
factors	   that	   could	   be	   driving	   behaviour.	   The	   questionnaire	   included	   a	   few	   questions	  
about	   cultural	  background	   to	  verify	  where	   the	  participants	  were	  born	  and	  raised.	  We	  
also	   asked	   participants	   for	   their	   predictions	   about	   their	   opponent’s	   behaviour	   when	  
playing	  the	  game.	  This	  was	  to	  see	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  difference	  in	  expectations	  when	  
playing	   someone	   from	   another	   culture.	   The	   entire	   set	   of	   questions	   in	   the	   follow-­‐up	  
questionnaire	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  Two.	  
4.	  Results	  
Figure	   6	   shows	   some	   summary	   statistics	   of	   our	   sample.	   While	   age	   was	   quite	  
similar	  across	  cultures,	  the	  East	  Asian	  sample	  contained	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  females	  
than	   the	   British	   sample.	   The	   East	   Asian	   sample	   also	   contained	   a	   slightly	   higher	  
proportion	  of	  business	  majors.	  On	  average,	  East	  Asian	  students	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  UK	  for	  
3.30	  years,	  compared	  to	  an	  average	  of	  17.43	  for	  the	  British	  students,	  most	  of	  whom	  had	  
lived	   in	  Britain	   for	   their	   entire	   lives.	  This	   indicates	   that	   the	  East	  Asian	   students	  were	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indeed	  exposed	  to	  a	  different	  cultural	  upbringing	  than	  the	  British.	  We	  controlled	  for	  all	  
of	  these	  demographic	  variables	  in	  our	  regression	  analysis.	  
Figure	  6:	  Summary	  Statistics	  
Averages	   East	  Asian	   British	  
Age	  (years)	   21.06	   19.73	  
Percentage	  of	  Females	   79.69%	   33.33%	  
Percentage	  of	  Business	  Majors	   82.54%	   75.00%	  
Years	  in	  the	  UK	   3.30	   17.43	  
	  
4.1	  Stag	  Hunt	  Game	  
	   The	  results	  from	  the	  stag	  hunt	  game	  are	  reported	  below	  in	  Figures	  7	  and	  8.	  Here	  
we	  not	  only	  see	  a	  difference	  between	   the	  same	  culture	  and	  mixed	  culture	   treatments,	  
but	  we	  find	  a	  difference	  in	  behaviour	  between	  cultures.	  When	  the	  British	  students	  were	  
faced	  with	  an	  East	  Asian	  opponent,	  they	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  go	  for	  the	  payoff	  dominant	  
outcome	  than	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  British	  opponent	  (p	  =	  0.079	  using	  a	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  U-­‐
test5).	   However,	   the	   East	   Asian	   students	   were	   no	   less	   likely	   to	   choose	   the	   payoff	  
dominant	   outcome	   when	   faced	   with	   a	   British	   opponent	   compared	   to	   an	   East	   Asian	  
opponent.	   In	   fact,	   the	  proportion	  of	  East	  Asians	   choosing	  each	  option	  was	  exactly	   the	  
same	  in	  each	  treatment.	  
We	  also	  checked	  the	  expectations	  data	  from	  our	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaire.	  While	  
the	   East	   Asian	   students	   did	   not	   differentiate	   between	   the	   same	   culture	   and	   mixed	  
culture	  treatments,	  the	  British	  students	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  expect	  East	  Asian	  students	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




choose	  the	  payoff	  dominant	  outcome	  compared	  to	  other	  British.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  
British	  may	   have	   been	   relying	   on	   a	   cultural	   stereotype	   of	   East	   Asians	   being	   cautious	  
(Hsee	  and	  Weber,	  1999).	  
Figure	  7:	  Proportion	  of	  British	  and	  East	  Asian	  students	  choosing	  stag	  or	  hare	  when	  
faced	  with	  an	  opponent	  from	  the	  same	  culture	  
	  
	  
Figure	  8:	  Proportion	  of	  British	  and	  East	  Asian	  students	  choosing	  stag	  or	  hare	  when	  
faced	  with	  an	  opponent	  from	  a	  different	  culture	  
	  
	  














4.2	  Stag	  Hunt	  Game:	  Regression	  Analysis	  
We	  ran	  a	  probit	  regression	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  participants	  chose	  to	  hunt	  stag.	  
Our	   dependent	   variable	   was	   binary,	   hunting	   stag	   =	   1	   and	   hunting	   hare	   =	   0.	   We	  
controlled	  for	  the	  following	  variables:	  culture	  (East	  Asian	  =	  1,	  British	  =	  0),	  age	  in	  years,	  
gender	  (female	  =	  1,	  male	  =	  0),	  subject	  major	  (business	  major	  =	  1,	  otherwise	  =	  0),	  years	  
in	  the	  UK,	  an	  interaction	  term	  for	  culture	  and	  gender	  (East	  Asian	  female	  =	  1,	  otherwise	  =	  
0),	   and	   treatment	   (same	   culture	  =	  1,	   different	   culture	  =	  0).	   The	   coefficients	   from	   this	  
regression	  are	  presented	  below	  in	  Figure	  9.	  









According	  to	  the	  regression	  results,	  culture	  (being	  East	  Asian	  or	  British)	  does	  not	  
influence	   the	   choice	   to	   hunt	   stag	   rather	   than	   hare.	   This	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   British	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  given	  in	  parentheses.	  Significance	  at	  the	  90%,	  95%,	  and	  99%	  level	  of	  confidence	  is	  
indicated	  with	  *,	  **,	  and	  ***,	  respectively.	  	  
	   Coefficients	  
East	  Asian	   0.581	  (0.932)	  
Age	   	  	  	  	  0.410**	  (0.177)	  
Female	   0.183	  (0.536)	  
Business	  Major	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.513	  (0.527)	  
Years	  in	  UK	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.003	  (0.045)	  
East	  Asian	  Female	   -­‐0.653	  	  (0.903)	  
Same	  Culture	   	  0.601	  	  (0.368)	  
Constant	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐8.290**	  	  (3.699)	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student’s	  predictions	  that	  East	  Asians	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  choose	  stag.	  Age	  is	  the	  only	  
significant	  demographic	  variable,	  with	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  choosing	  stag.	  
4.3	  Bargaining	  Game	  
Similarly	   to	   the	   stag	   hunt	   results,	   we	   also	   obtain	   a	   cultural	   difference	   in	   the	  
bargaining	   game.	   The	   results	   are	   presented	   below	   in	   Figures	   10	   and	   11.	   East	   Asians	  
demanded	  slightly	  less	  of	  the	  pie	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  British	  opponent	  compared	  to	  the	  
all-­‐East	  Asian	   treatment,	  although	  this	  difference	   is	  not	  significant	  (p	  =	  0.389).	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  British	  demanded	  more	  when	  faced	  with	  an	  East	  Asian	  opponent	  compared	  
to	   the	   all-­‐British	   treatment,	  which	   is	   a	   significant	   result	   (p	  =	   0.010).	   The	   British	   also	  
contrasted	  the	  theoretical	  prediction	  that	  people	  will	  choose	  safer	  options	  when	  faced	  
with	  an	  opponent	  from	  a	  different	  culture.	  However,	  the	  coordination	  worked	  well,	  with	  
the	   British	   demanding	   more	   and	   East	   Asians	   demanding	   less	   when	   faced	   with	   an	  
opponent	  from	  a	  different	  culture.	  
According	  to	  our	  expectations	  data	  from	  the	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaire,	  the	  British	  
students	   expected	   East	   Asian	   students	   to	   claim	   less	   of	   the	   pie	   than	   other	   British	  
students.	  This	  suggests	   that	   the	  cultural	  difference	   in	   the	  bargaining	  game	  could	  have	  
been	  driven	  by	  social	  norms.	  Perhaps	  the	  East	  Asian	  students	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  be	  politer	  
towards	   the	   British	   students	   than	   the	   other	   East	   Asian	   students,	   as	   they	   considered	  
themselves	  guests	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  British	  students	  may	  have	  expected	  East	  Asians	  to	  be	  
polite	  towards	  them,	  based	  on	  their	  personal	  experiences,	  and	  therefore	  expected	  to	  be	  





Figure	  10:	  Proportion	  of	  British	  and	  East	  Asian	  students	  choosing	  each	  bargaining	  game	  
option	  when	  faced	  with	  an	  opponent	  from	  the	  same	  culture	  
	  
	  
Figure	  11:	  Proportion	  of	  British	  and	  East	  Asian	  students	  choosing	  each	  bargaining	  game	  
option	  when	  faced	  with	  an	  opponent	  from	  a	  different	  culture	  
	  
	  
	   4.4	  Bargaining	  Game:	  Regression	  Analysis	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  stag	  hunt,	  we	  ran	  a	  probit	  regression	  on	  choices	  in	  the	  bargaining	  game.	  
Again,	  our	  dependant	  variable	  was	  binary,	  with	  a	  risky	  choice	  (25	  or	  30)	  =	  1	  and	  a	  safe	  


















choice	  (10	  or	  15)	  =	  0.	  We	  controlled	  for	  the	  following	  variables:	  culture	  (East	  Asian	  =	  1,	  
British	  =	  0),	  age	  in	  years,	  gender	  (female	  =	  1,	  male	  =	  0),	  subject	  major	  (business	  major	  =	  
1,	  otherwise	  =	  0),	  years	  in	  the	  UK,	  an	  interaction	  term	  for	  culture	  and	  gender	  (East	  Asian	  
female	  =	  1,	  otherwise	  =	  0),	  and	  treatment	  (same	  culture	  =	  1,	  different	  culture	  =	  0).	  The	  
coefficients	   from	   this	   regression	   are	   presented	   below	   in	   Figure	   12.	   None	   of	   the	  
coefficients	  are	  statistically	  significant	  in	  this	  regression.	  	  










	   Why,	  then,	  do	  the	  East	  Asians	  differentiate	  based	  on	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  opponent	  
in	   the	   bargaining	   game	   but	   not	   the	   stag	   hunt?	   The	   stag	   hunt	   game	   is	   more	  
straightforward	   and	   has	   an	   obvious	   focal	   point	   of	   both	   players	   going	   for	   the	   payoff	  
dominant	  outcome.	  Perhaps	  the	  East	  Asians	  thought	  this	  choice	  was	  obvious	  regardless	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  given	  in	  parentheses.	  Significance	  at	  the	  90%,	  95%,	  and	  99%	  level	  of	  confidence	  is	  
indicated	  with	  *,	  **,	  and	  ***,	  respectively.	  	  
	   Coefficients	  
East	  Asian	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐1.327	  (0.931)	  
Age	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.037	  (0.067)	  
Female	   0.262	  (0.504)	  
Business	  Major	   -­‐0.285	  	  (0.393)	  
Years	  in	  UK	   -­‐0.026	  	  (0.044)	  
East	  Asian	  Female	   0.796	  (0.843)	  
Same	  Culture	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐0.437	  (0.337)	  
Constant	   1.630	  (1.683)	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of	   the	   opponent,	   whereas	   the	   bargaining	   game	   required	  more	   thought.	   However,	   we	  
cannot	  glean	  any	  evidence	  of	  longer	  response	  time	  in	  the	  bargaining	  game	  compared	  to	  
the	  stag	  hunt	  in	  our	  z-­‐Tree	  output.	  Similarly,	  East	  Asians	  may	  interpret	  the	  two	  games	  in	  
different	  ways,	  with	  the	  stag	  hunt	  being	  focused	  on	  efficiency	  while	  the	  bargaining	  game	  
is	   about	   fairness.	   Identity	  may	   then	  play	   a	   greater	   role	  when	  making	  decisions	   about	  
fairness	  as	  opposed	  to	  efficiency.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  consider	  both	  social	  preferences	  and	  
expectations	  of	  the	  opponent’s	  behaviour	  as	  potential	  explanations	  for	  our	  results.	  
	   5.1	  Stereotypes	  
	   The	  British	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  careful	  in	  the	  stag	  hunt	  but	  more	  risk	  taking	  in	  the	  
bargaining	  game,	  when	  faced	  with	  a	  foreign	  opponent.	  While	  this	  behaviour	  may	  seem	  
odd,	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  by	  thinking	  about	  stereotypes.	  The	  British	  may	  expect	  
East	   Asians	   to	   choose	   the	   safer	   options	   in	   both	   games,	   which	   would	   mean	   that	   the	  
British	  should	  also	  play	  it	  safe	  in	  the	  stag	  hunt	  but	  take	  a	  risk	  in	  the	  bargaining	  game.	  
When	   looking	   at	   the	   expectations	   data,	   East	   Asian	   participants	   do	   not	   show	   much	  
difference	  between	  treatments.	  However,	  the	  British	  expect	  the	  East	  Asians	  to	  demand	  
much	  less	  of	  the	  pie	  than	  other	  British.	  The	  British	  also	  expect	  East	  Asians	  to	  be	  more	  
likely	  to	  choose	  the	  safe	  option	  in	  the	  stag	  hunt	  compared	  to	  other	  British.	  
	   According	  to	  the	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaires,	  a	  few	  people	  had	  an	  inkling	  that	  the	  
experiment	  was	  about	  ethnicity.	  For	  example,	  when	  asked	  for	  aspects	  of	  the	  opponent’s	  
identity	   they	   considered	   in	  making	   their	   decision,	   one	   participant	   commented	   “Their	  
gender,	  their	  race/ethnicity,	  their	  nationality.”	  Although	  only	  a	  few	  people	  (four	  in	  total)	  
guessed	   that	   the	   experiment	   was	   about	   ethnicity,	   others	   may	   have	   subconsciously	  
picked	   up	   on	   cultural	   stereotypes.	   This	   is	   especially	   true	   given	   our	   priming	  
questionnaire	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  experiment.	  While	  the	  questionnaire	  was	  intended	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to	   induce	   social	   norms,	   rather	   than	   stereotypes,	   there	   is	   a	   possibility	   that	   the	  
questionnaire	  heightened	  students’	  susceptibility	  to	  stereotypes.	  	  
	   The	  most	  likely	  explanation	  for	  the	  results	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  British	  students	  
expected	   the	  East	   Asians	   to	   behave	   cautiously	   in	   both	   games.	   In	   other	  words,	   British	  
students	  expected	  that	  East	  Asian	  students	  would	  take	  the	  safe	  option	  in	  the	  stag	  hunt	  
and	   demand	   less	   of	   the	   pie	   in	   the	   bargaining	   game.	   Is	   this	   stereotype	   true?	   To	  
investigate	   this,	   we	   restrict	   ourselves	   to	   the	   same	   culture	   treatments,	   where	   the	  
decisions	   are	   less	   complicated	   by	   trying	   to	   figure	   out	   the	   cultural	   norms	   of	   the	  
opponents.	  
	   When	  looking	  at	  the	  same	  culture	  treatments,	  East	  Asians	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  hunt	  
stag	  than	  British	  and	  also	  demand	  more	  of	  the	  pie	  in	  the	  bargaining	  game.	  This	  means	  
that	   a	   stereotype	   of	   East	   Asians	   being	   cautious	   is	   not	   only	   misleading,	   but	   has	   real	  
effects	  on	  behaviour.	  Even	  the	  East	  Asian	  students	  appear	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  their	  own	  
stereotype	   in	   the	  bargaining	   game,	  where	   they	  demand	   less	  of	   the	  pie	   against	  British	  
students	   than	   in	   the	   same	   culture	   treatment.	   East	   Asian	   students	   may	   lower	   their	  
demands	   against	   the	   British	   students	   because	   they	   expect	   the	   British	   students	   to	  
demand	  more,	  based	  on	  the	  stereotype	  that	  East	  Asians	  are	  cautious.	  These	  results	  are	  
in-­‐line	  with	  Hsee	  and	  Weber’s	  (1999)	  study	  that	  finds	  Chinese	  to	  be	  more	  risk	  seeking	  
than	  Americans,	  even	  though	  both	  groups	  predicted	  the	  opposite,	  and	  also	  Shih	  et	  al’s	  
(1999)	  finding	  that	  even	  stereotypes	  about	  one’s	  own	  culture	  can	  affect	  behaviour.	  
	   5.2	  Norms	  vs.	  Identity	  
	   We	  can	  now	  consider	  whether	  cultural	  norms	  or	  the	  opponent’s	  identity	  had	  the	  
greatest	   influence	   on	   behaviour.	   As	   we	   observe	   a	   difference	   in	   behaviour	   between	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British	  and	  East	  Asians	  in	  many	  of	  the	  same	  culture	  treatments,	  we	  can	  speculate	  that	  
cultural	  norms	  play	  a	  part	   in	   the	  decision	  making	  process.	  However,	   the	  difference	   in	  
behaviour	   between	   the	   same	   culture	   and	   different	   culture	   treatments	   shows	   that	  
identity	   also	   comes	   into	   play.	   Chuah	   et	   al	   (2007)	   also	   find	   cultural	   differences	   both	  
when	   interacting	   within	   national	   groups	   and	   with	   those	   from	   another	   group,	   when	  
looking	   at	   ultimatum	  game	   responses	   of	  Malaysian	  Chinese	   and	  UK	  participants.	   This	  
suggests	  that	  both	  cultural	  norms	  and	  the	  opponent’s	  identity	  play	  a	  part	  in	  interactive	  
decision	  making.	  
	   5.3	  Efficiency	  
We	   can	   also	   consider	   whether	   playing	   someone	   from	   a	   different	   culture	  
improves	  or	  hinders	   efficiency.	  For	  both	  games,	   the	  payments	   are	  higher	   in	   the	   same	  
culture	   treatments	   than	   the	  different	   culture	   treatments.	  However,	   for	   the	  bargaining	  
game	   we	   notice	   fairly	   good	   coordination	   between	   East	   Asians	   and	   British	   in	   the	  
different	  culture	  treatments.	  British	  increase	  their	  demands	  when	  facing	  an	  East	  Asian	  
opponent	   compared	   to	   another	   British	   opponent,	   while	   East	   Asians	   lower	   their	  
demands	   against	   the	   British.	   The	   players	   seem	   to	   be	   using	   cultural	   stereotypes	   to	  
predict	   each	   other’s	   behaviour	   and	   choose	   their	   action	   accordingly.	   Interestingly,	  
players	  perform	  better	  by	  behaving	  according	  to	  the	  stereotype,	  even	  if	  the	  stereotype	  
is	  untrue.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  coordination	  is	  hindered	  in	  the	  different	  culture	  treatments	  in	  
the	  stag	  hunt	  game.	  While	  East	  Asians	  tend	  to	  go	  for	  the	  payoff	  dominant	  choice,	  British	  
get	   the	   wrong	   impression	   by	   believing	   East	   Asians	   will	   be	   cautious	   and	   choose	   the	  
certain	   outcome.	   Therefore,	   British	   tend	   to	   choose	   the	   certain	   outcome,	   based	   on	   a	  
misleading	   stereotype,	   when	   they	   could	   do	   better	   by	   choosing	   the	   payoff	   dominant	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outcome.	  Therefore,	   stereotypes	  may	  sometimes	  be	  a	  useful	  guide	   to	  behaviour	  when	  
there	  is	  little	  else	  to	  base	  decisions	  on,	  but	  can	  also	  harm	  efficiency	  if	  the	  opponents	  do	  
not	  behave	  according	  to	  their	  stereotypes.	  
5.4	  Social	  Preferences	  
	   While	  we	   have	   considered	   expectations	   of	   the	   opponent’s	   behaviour	   based	   on	  
their	   identity,	   we	   have	   yet	   to	  mention	   how	   social	   preferences	  may	   differ	   by	   culture.	  
Perhaps	  the	  players	  care	  more	  about	  each	  other’s	  payoffs	  when	  they	  are	  from	  the	  same	  
culture.	   Chen	   and	   Chen	   (2011)	   consider	   an	   other-­‐regarding	   parameter	   that	   increases	  
when	   players	   share	   a	   common	   group	   identity.	   While	   Chen	   and	   Chen	   (2011)	   find	   an	  
improvement	  in	  coordination	  when	  players	  share	  a	  group	  identity,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  
this	   is	   because	   they	   care	  more	   about	   each	  other’s	   payoff,	   or	   because	   they	  believe	   the	  
other	   player	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   choose	   the	   payoff	   dominant	   outcome	  when	   they	   come	  
from	   the	   same	   group.	   Reciprocity	   is	   likely	   to	   feature	   in	   Chen	   and	   Chen’s	   (2011)	  
experiment	   as	   the	   participants	   helped	   each	   other	   in	   a	   task	   before	   taking	   part	   in	   the	  
game.	   Therefore,	   expectations	   of	   reciprocity	   may	   have	   improved	   the	   coordination,	  
rather	  than	  altruistic	  feelings	  towards	  those	  from	  the	  same	  group.	  
	   Separating	   beliefs	   from	   social	   preferences	   is	   also	   difficult	   in	   our	   experiment.	  
However,	  when	  reading	  through	  responses	  to	  our	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaire,	  the	  players	  
appear	  to	  be	  trying	  to	  maximise	  their	  own	  payoff,	  with	  little	  regard	  for	  the	  other	  player.	  
For	  example,	  many	  players	  mention	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  “I	  wanted	  to	  guarantee	  




Worth	  noting,	   is	   that	  motivations	   for	  behaviour	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  different	   in	   the	  
stag	  hunt	   than	  the	  bargaining	  game.	  The	  stag	  hunt	   is	  a	  game	  of	  cooperation	  while	   the	  
bargaining	  game	  is	  one	  of	  competition.	  In	  the	  stag	  hunt,	  the	  option	  that	  maximises	  the	  
player’s	   payoff	   also	   maximises	   the	   opponent’s	   payoff.	   Therefore,	   decisions	   are	   more	  
likely	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  expectations	  of	  the	  other’s	  behaviour	  than	  social	  preferences.	   In	  
contrast,	  the	  bargaining	  game	  introduces	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  player’s	  payoff	  and	  the	  
opponent’s	  payoff.	  Here	  social	  preferences	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  play	  a	  role,	  as	  the	  player	  
must	   decide	   how	   much	   they	   care	   about	   their	   own	   payoff	   relative	   to	   the	   opponent’s	  
payoff.	  
	   Cultural	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  in-­‐groups	  and	  out-­‐groups	  are	  formed	  and	  defined	  
may	  also	  impact	  the	  level	  of	  altruism	  players	  feel	  towards	  each	  other.	  Forming	  a	  group	  
takes	  longer	  in	  collectivist	  cultures	  as	  bonding	  is	  necessary,	  whereas	  individualists	  have	  
many	  superficial	  interactions	  and	  perhaps	  in-­‐groups	  are	  formed	  more	  readily	  (Triandis,	  
1989).	   This	   means	   that	   students	   from	   collectivist	   cultures,	   such	   as	   many	   East	   Asian	  
countries,	  may	  perceive	   all	   others	   as	  out-­‐groups	   as	   their	   in-­‐groups	  only	   include	   close	  
friends	   and	   family	   and	   are	   not	   extended	   to	   nationality.	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   students	  
from	   collectivist	   cultures	   could	   be	   less	   susceptible	   to	   group	   identity	   effects.	   This	   is	   a	  
research	   question	   for	   the	   future,	   along	   with	   experiments	   to	   isolate	   the	   effects	   of	  
altruism	  versus	  expectations	  of	  the	  opponent’s	  behaviour.	  
	   5.5	  Design	  Limitations	  
	   Another	  possibility	   is	   that	  participants	  did	  not	   consider	   the	  cultural	   identity	  of	  
their	   opponent	   in	   decision	   making	   and	   treated	   the	   opponent	   simply	   as	   “another	  
student”.	   In	   Eichberger	   et	   al’s	   (2008)	   experiment,	   the	   participants	   are	   given	  
descriptions	   of	   the	   granny	   and	   game	   theorist,	  which	  make	   them	  more	  believable	   and	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easier	  to	  imagine.	  Perhaps	  having	  students	  of	  a	  different	  culture	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  
room	  was	  not	   enough	   to	   distinguish	   a	   cultural	   identity.	  However,	   le	  Roux	   and	  Kelsey	  
(2016)	   give	   their	   participants	   background	   information	   about	   the	   Indian	   students	   but	  
still	   find	   no	   difference	   in	   the	   level	   of	   ambiguity	   against	   a	   foreign	   or	   home	   opponent.	  
Eichberger	   et	   al	   (2008)	   find	   that	   other	   students	   are	   also	   a	   source	   of	   ambiguity,	  with	  
other	  students	  being	  perceived	  as	  more	  ambiguous	  than	  the	  game	  theorist	  and	  just	  as	  
ambiguous	  as	  the	  granny.	  An	  interesting	  idea	  for	  future	  research	  would	  be	  to	  combine	  
the	  cultural	  identity	  of	  the	  opponent	  with	  further	  information,	  such	  as	  “the	  opponent	  is	  
studying	  game	  theory”	  to	  see	  how	  the	  two	  components	  of	  identity	  interact.	  
	   As	   part	   of	   the	   follow-­‐up	   questionnaire	   we	   ask	   participants	   whether	   they	  
considered	  the	  identity	  of	  their	  opponent	  when	  making	  their	  decision.	  East	  Asians	  are	  
slightly	  more	   likely	   to	   answer	   this	   question	  with	   “yes”	   but	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   some	  
misunderstanding	  about	  what	  the	  question	  was	  asking.	  For	  example,	  when	  asked	  what	  
aspects	  of	  the	  opponent’s	   identity	  they	  considered,	  several	  students	  talk	  about	  mutual	  
benefit	   or	   what	   choice	   they	   thought	   the	   opponent	   would	   take.	   According	   to	   our	  
questionnaire	   responses,	   identity	   is	   actually	   considered	   more	   in	   the	   same-­‐culture	  
treatments	  than	  the	  different-­‐culture	  treatments.	  However,	  very	  few	  students	  mention	  
culture	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  identity	  they	  considered.	  	  
	   We	  also	  need	  to	  consider	  whether	  our	  priming	  questionnaire	  had	  a	  differential	  
impact	   on	   British	   students	   compared	   to	   East	   Asian	   students.	   The	   questionnaire	  
probably	   felt	   quite	   normal	   for	   international	   students,	  with	   questions	   about	   how	   long	  
you	  have	  lived	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  how	  often	  you	  speak	  to	  people	  from	  your	  home	  country.	  
However,	  this	  questionnaire	  may	  have	  felt	  quite	  strange,	  or	  had	  little	  or	  no	  impact,	  for	  
the	  British	  students.	  In	  addition,	  the	  questionnaire	  may	  have	  primed	  aspects	  of	  identity	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other	  than	  culture,	  such	  as	  a	  sense	  of	  family.	  Priming	  a	  sense	  of	  family	  could	  change	  the	  
mood	  of	  East	  Asian	   students	   in	   a	  different	  way	   to	  British	   students.	   For	   example,	  East	  
Asian	  students	  may	  feel	  sad	  when	  family	  is	  primed	  as	  they	  are	  probably	  very	  far	  away	  
from	  their	  families,	  while	  British	  students	  are	  a	  lot	  closer.	  
	   These	   concerns	   highlight	   a	   key	   caveat	  with	   our	   data,	   sample	   bias.	   The	   sample	  
bias	   comes	   from	   comparing	   the	   behaviour	   of	   home	   students	   with	   international	  
students,	  who	  may	  be	  inherently	  different	  in	  personality.	  Our	  results	  may	  be	  driven	  by	  
differences	  between	  home	  and	  international	  students,	  rather	  than	  cultural	  differences.	  
Our	   sample	   also	   only	   includes	   students.	   Therefore,	   our	   results	   cannot	   be	   used	   to	  
generalise	  to	  entire	  cultures.	  
6.	  Conclusions	  
	   We	  expected	  that	  players	  would	  experience	  more	  ambiguity	  when	  faced	  with	  an	  
opponent	   from	  a	  different	   culture	   and	   therefore	   choose	   safer	   options	   in	   coordination	  
games.	   This	   is	   because	   players	   may	   find	   it	   harder	   to	   predict	   each	   other’s	   behaviour	  
when	  they	  do	  not	  share	  similar	  social	  norms.	  	  
	   In	   the	   stag	   hunt	   game,	   the	   British	   students	   tended	   to	   go	   for	   the	   safe,	   risk	  
dominant,	  outcome	  against	  the	  East	  Asians,	  even	  though	  most	  East	  Asians	  still	  tried	  to	  
achieve	   the	  payoff	  dominant	  outcome.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	   the	  bargaining	  game	   the	  
British	   students	   increased	   their	   demands	   against	   the	   East	   Asians	   while	   East	   Asians	  
lowered	   their	   demands	   against	   the	   British.	   One	   likely	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   a	   cultural	  
stereotype	   of	   East	   Asians	   being	   cautious.	   Based	   on	   our	   results,	   this	   stereotype	   was	  
proven	  to	  be	  misleading.	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Appendix	  One:	  Experiment	  Instructions	  
Instructions	  
You	  are	  about	  to	  take	  part	  in	  an	  experiment.	  Your	  payoff	  from	  this	  experiment	  will	  
depend	  on	  the	  decisions	  you	  make	  during	  the	  experiment.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  important	  that	  
you	  carefully	  read	  and	  understand	  these	  instructions.	  
Please	  do	  not	  communicate	  with	  the	  other	  participants	  at	  any	  stage	  during	  the	  
experiment.	  If	  you	  have	  a	  question,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  and	  the	  experimenter	  will	  
assist	  you.	  
Your	  earnings	  from	  the	  experiment	  will	  be	  in	  Experimental	  Currency	  Units	  (ECU).	  Each	  
ECU	  is	  worth	  £XX	  (£0.05	  for	  stag	  hunt,	  £0.20	  for	  bargaining	  game).	  After	  the	  experiment,	  
your	  earnings	  will	  be	  converted	  into	  pounds,	  and	  you	  will	  be	  paid	  anonymously	  in	  cash	  
before	  you	  leave	  the	  room.	  You	  will	  also	  receive	  a	  £2	  show-­‐up	  fee,	  in	  addition	  to	  any	  
money	  earned	  during	  the	  experiment.	  
The	  experiment	  will	  start	  with	  a	  questionnaire	  which	  will	  shortly	  appear	  on	  the	  
computer	  screen.	  Please	  complete	  the	  questions	  and	  then	  click	  the	  “OK”	  button	  at	  the	  
bottom	  of	  the	  screen.	  
After	  everyone	  has	  completed	  the	  questionnaire,	  instructions	  will	  be	  handed	  out	  for	  the	  
next	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment.	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Stag	  Hunt	  Instructions	  
In	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment,	  you	  will	  play	  the	  game	  described	  below.	  You	  will	  be	  
randomly	  matched	  with	  another	  player	  who	  is	  sitting	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  room	  to	  
you.	  	  
The	  game	  consists	  of	  a	  choice	  between	  1	  and	  2.	  Your	  payoff	  depends	  on	  both	  your	  own	  
choice	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  player	  you	  are	  matched	  with,	  who	  is	  sitting	  on	  the	  other	  
side	  of	  the	  room.	  
The	  payoff	  table	  for	  this	  game	  is	  illustrated	  below.	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  table	  correspond	  
to	  your	  payoffs	  in	  ECU,	  for	  every	  possible	  combination	  of	  choices	  by	  you	  and	  the	  other	  
player.	  The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  is	  your	  payoff	  and	  the	  second	  number	  is	  the	  other	  
player’s	  payoff.	  
If	  both	  you	  and	  the	  other	  player	  choose	  2,	  you	  each	  receive	  a	  payoff	  of	  60	  ECU.	  If	  both	  
players	  choose	  1,	  you	  each	  receive	  a	  payoff	  of	  40.	  If	  one	  player	  chooses	  2	  while	  the	  other	  
chooses	  1,	  the	  player	  choosing	  2	  receives	  0	  while	  the	  player	  choosing	  1	  receives	  40.	  
Please	  input	  your	  choice	  of	  1	  or	  2	  into	  the	  computer	  when	  asked	  to	  do	  so.	  You	  will	  not	  
know	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  other	  player	  until	  after	  you	  have	  made	  a	  decision.	  
If	  you	  have	  a	  question,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  and	  the	  experimenter	  will	  assist	  you.	  
	  
	   	   Other	  Player’s	  Choice	  
	   	   2	   1	  
Your	  
Choice	  
2	   60,	  60	   0,	  40	  
1	   40,	  0	   40,	  40	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Bargaining	  Game	  Instructions	  
In	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment,	  you	  will	  play	  the	  game	  described	  below.	  You	  will	  be	  
randomly	  matched	  with	  another	  player	  who	  is	  sitting	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  room	  to	  
you.	  	  
You	  and	  another	  player	  are	  allocated	  40	  ECU	  to	  share	  between	  you.	  You	  need	  to	  decide	  
how	  much	  of	  the	  40	  ECU	  you	  will	  demand	  for	  yourself	  and	  the	  other	  player	  will	  do	  the	  
same.	  If	  the	  total	  demands	  from	  you	  and	  the	  other	  player	  exceed	  40	  ECU,	  you	  will	  both	  
receive	  0.	  If	  the	  total	  demands	  are	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  40,	  each	  of	  you	  will	  receive	  the	  
amount	  you	  demanded.	  
The	  payoff	  table	  for	  this	  game	  is	  illustrated	  below.	  The	  numbers	  in	  the	  table	  correspond	  
to	  your	  payoffs	  in	  ECU,	  for	  every	  possible	  combination	  of	  choices	  by	  you	  and	  the	  other	  
player.	  The	  first	  number	  in	  each	  cell	  is	  your	  payoff	  and	  the	  second	  number	  is	  the	  other	  
player’s	  payoff.	  
As	  an	  example,	  if	  you	  choose	  25	  and	  the	  other	  player	  chooses	  15,	  the	  total	  demands	  are	  
40.	  In	  this	  case,	  you	  will	  receive	  25	  and	  the	  other	  player	  will	  receive	  15.	  However	  if	  you	  
choose	  25	  and	  the	  other	  player	  also	  chooses	  25,	  the	  total	  demands	  are	  50.	  In	  this	  case,	  
you	  will	  both	  receive	  0.	  
As	   another	   example,	   if	   you	   choose	   10	   and	   the	   other	   player	   chooses	   15,	   the	   total	  
demands	  are	  25,	  which	   is	   less	   than	  40.	   In	   this	  case,	  you	  will	   receive	  10	  and	   the	  other	  
player	  will	  receive	  15.	  
Please	  input	  your	  choice	  of	  10,	  15,	  25,	  or	  30	  into	  the	  computer	  when	  asked	  to	  do	  so.	  You	  
will	  not	  know	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  other	  player	  until	  after	  you	  have	  made	  a	  decision.	  
If	  you	  have	  a	  question,	  please	  raise	  your	  hand	  and	  the	  experimenter	  will	  assist	  you.	  
	   	   Other	  Player’s	  Choice	  
	   	   30	   25	   15	   10	  
	   30	   0,	  0	   0,	  0	   0,	  0	   30,	  10	  
Your	  
Choice	  
25	   0,	  0	   0,	  0	   25,	  15	   25,	  10	  
15	   0,	  0	   15,	  25	   15,	  15	   15,	  10	  




Appendix	  Two:	  Follow-­‐up	  Questionnaire	  
Please	  answer	  the	  following	  questions	  and	  click	  the	  "OK"	  button	  when	  complete.	  
How	  did	  you	  decide	  what	  option	  to	  choose?	  
What	  did	  you	  think	  the	  other	  player	  would	  choose?	  
Did	  you	  consider	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  other	  player	  when	  making	  your	  decision?	  
If	  you	  answered	  "yes"	  above,	  what	  aspects	  of	  the	  other	  player's	  identity	  did	  you	  
consider?	  
What	  do	  you	  think	  this	  experiment	  was	  about?	  (Optional)	  
-­‐ OK	  Button	  -­‐	  	  
Please	  answer	  the	  following	  questions	  and	  click	  the	  "OK"	  button	  when	  complete.	  




Nationality(ies)	  of	  your	  parents:	  
Country	  of	  birth:	  
Native	  language:	  
Second	  languages:	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